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OPTIMAL INTERTEMPORAL RISK ALLOCATION
APPLIED TO INSURANCE PRICING
KEI FUKUDA, AKIHIKO INOUE AND YUMIHARU NAKANO
Abstract. We present a general approach to the pricing of products in fi-
nance and insurance in the multi-period setting. It is a combination of the
utility indifference pricing and optimal intertemporal risk allocation. We give
a characterization of the optimal intertemporal risk allocation by a first order
condition. Applying this result to the exponential utility function, we obtain
an essentially new type of premium calculation method for a popular type
of multi-period insurance contract. This method is simple and can be easily
implemented numerically. We see that the results of numerical calculations
are well coincident with the risk loading level determined by traditional prac-
tices. The results also suggest a possible implied utility approach to insurance
pricing.
1. Introduction
The insurer of an insurance contract needs to ensure that the premium contains
a necessary conservative margin — the so called risk loading or safety loading — to
put up the risk capital. When determining this margin in a multi-period insurance
contract, the insurer faces two types of risks to evaluate. The first one comes
from unfavorable fluctuations in the level of investment funded by accumulated
premiums. The second risk comes from the uncertainty of (life) time, i.e., the risk
of the unfavorable event occurring at an inopportune time, e.g., before the funding
target is reached. It is desirable to determine the margin that reflects both types of
risks adequately. However, there seems to be no theoretically established solution
to this challenging problem. The main difficulty is in the inseparable nature of the
two types of risks themselves; the insurance contract guarantees a defined payment
at an uncertain time of the insured event occurring by uncertain funding.
In this paper, toward a solution to the problem above, we present a fairly general
approach to the multi-period pricing problem. It is a combination of the utility
indifference pricing and optimal intertemporal risk allocation. Though both are
quite general concepts, their combination leads us to an interesting new premium
calculation method in a multi-period setting.
The general setting of the utility indifference pricing is as follows: we define the
indifference price H(Z) of a risk Z by
(IP) U(w +H(Z)− Z) = U(w),
where U(W ) denotes the utility of a riskW and the constant w is the initial wealth
of the seller of Z. The price H(Z) is the so-called selling indifference price: H(Z)
is the amount that leaves the seller of the risk Z indifferent between selling and
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being paid for Z, and neither selling nor being paid for Z. In mathematical finance,
the indifference pricing approach is becoming one of the major pricing methods in
incomplete markets (see, e.g., Hodges and Neuberger [22], Rouge and El Karoui
[26], Musiela and Zariphopoulou [24], Bielecki et al. [4], and Møller and Steffensen
[25]). The indifference pricing also fits the pricing of insurance well. For example,
in the single-period pricing, we can show that many known premium principles
are obtained by this method. The expectation, variance and exponential premium
principles are among them. Thus, the utility indifference pricing approach has the
potential advantage of pricing products in finance and insurance coherently.
We write A(W ) for the class of admissible intertemporal risk allocations (Yt)t∈T
of W over the multi-period interval T := {1, 2, . . . , T } (see Definition 2.1 below):
(Yt)t∈T is an essentially bounded adapted process satisfying the risk allocation
condition
(RA)
∑
t∈T
Y˜t =W a.s.,
where Y˜t denotes the discounted value of Yt. In this paper, we adopt the following
utility U(·) in (IP):
(U) U(W ) := sup
{∑
t∈T
E[ut(Y˜t)] : (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W )
}
.
Here ut(x) is a time-dependent utility function describing the intertemporal pref-
erences of an economic agent such as an insurance company. This definition says
that if an allocation (Xt) ∈ A(W ) attains the supremum in (U), then the utility of
W is based on the choice of (Xt). Thus, to precisely investigate U(·), whence H(·),
we are led to the problem of finding (Xt) ∈ A(W ) that attains the supremum in
(U), which we call the optimal intertemporal risk allocation of W .
The optimal risk allocation problems date back to the classical work of Borch
[5, 6, 7], where Pareto optimality in uncertain circumstances is studied extensively,
motivated mainly by reinsurance. Since then, various types of optimal risk alloca-
tion problems have been considered by Bu¨hlmann [8, 9], Gerber [19], Bu¨hlmann and
Jewell [10], and many others. See also Gerber and Pafumi [20], Duffie [16], Dana
and Jeanblanc [13] and Dana and Scarsini [14]. Recently, many authors consider
the problems based on the preferences defined by coherent or convex risk measures
introduced by Artzner et al. [2], Delbaen [15], and Fo¨llmer and Schied [17] (see
also [18]). See, e.g., Heath and Ku [21], Barrieu and El Karoui [3], Burgert and
Ru¨schendorf [11], Acciaio [1], and Jouini et al. [23].
Unlike most of these references where the problems of optimal risk allocation
among several economic agents are discussed, we consider a single agent in the
multi-period framework who seeks to find the optimal intertemporal allocation of
her/his risk. As the definition itself suggests, this optimality is closely related to
Pareto optimality. Note, however, that classical Pareto optimality is concerned with
allocations of risk among economic agents in single-period models, while the Pareto
optimality we consider in this paper is concerned with intertemporal allocations of
the aggregate risk of a single agent in the multi-period setting, whence it may be
called time Pareto optimality.
Our key finding about the optimal intertemporal risk allocation (Theorem 2.8)
is that an allocation (Xt) ∈ A(W ) is optimal if and only if the following first order
condition is satisfied:
(FO) (u′t(X˜t))t∈T is an (Ft)-martingale,
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where u′t(x) := (dut/dx)(x) and (Ft)t∈T is the underlying information structure.
It is perhaps interesting that this first order condition involves a martingale prop-
erty. By applying this characterization to the exponential utility, we can derive
an algorithm to compute the optimal intertemporal risk allocation and indifference
price H(·) for it (Theorem 3.4). We illustrate the usefulness of this algorithm by
applying it to a popular type of multi-period insurance contract, whereby obtaining
an essentially new type of premium calculation method in the multi-period setting
(Theorem 4.3). This method is simple and can be easily implemented numerically.
We see that the results of numerical calculations are well coincident with the risk
loading level determined by traditional practices. The results also suggest a possible
implied utility approach to insurance pricing.
In §2, we give basic results on the optimal intertemporal risk allocation, including
its characterization by (FO) and its relationship to Pareto optimality. In §3, we
apply the results in §2 to the exponential utility function and derive the optimal
intertemporal risk allocation and indifference price for it. Section 4 is devoted to
the applications of the results in §3 to insurance pricing. We also discuss properties
of the indifference prices and some results of numerical calculations.
2. Optimal intertemporal risk allocation
Let T := {1, 2, . . . , T }. Throughout the paper, we work on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈{0}∪T, P ). We write L∞ := L∞(Ω,FT , P ) for the space of all
essentially bounded, real-valued FT -measurable random variables. Let (rt)t∈T be
a spot rate process. We assume that the process (rt)t∈T is bounded, nonnegative
and predictable, i.e., rt is bounded, nonnegative and Ft−1-measurable for all t ∈ T.
Let Bt be the price of the riskless bond:
B0 = 1, Bt =
t∏
k=1
(1 + rk) for t = 1, . . . , T.
Throughout the paper, we use (Bt)t∈T as the nume´raire, and for each price process
(Xt)t∈T, we denote by (X˜t)t∈T its discounted price process:
X˜t := Xt/Bt, t ∈ T.
2.1. Optimality. We consider an economic agent such as an insurance company
who wishes to allocate her/his aggregate risk W over the multi-period interval T.
In the next definition, we define the collection of all such possible intertemporal
allocations of W .
Definition 2.1. For W ∈ L∞, we write A(W ) for the following set of admissible
intertemporal allocations (Yt)t∈T of W :
A(W ) :=
{
(Yt)t∈T :
(Yt)t∈T is an (Ft)-adapted process satisfying
(RA) and Yt ∈ L∞ for all t ∈ T.
}
.
Example 2.2. We consider the aggregate risk W of a life insurance contract with
duration T in which the insured receives ct dollars at time t ∈ T if she/he dies in
the period (t− 1, t]. Then, we have W =∑t∈T Y˜t with Yt := c(t)1(t−1<τ≤t), where
τ is the stopping time representing the lifetime of the insured. Notice that (Yt)t∈T
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itself is in A(W ). If we define (Xt)t∈T by
Xt =


0, t = 1,
(1 + rt)Yt−1, t = 2, . . . , T − 1,
YT + (1 + rT )YT−1, t = T,
then (Xt)t∈T is also in A(W ). Insurance companies which have many contracts
with policyholders will be able to regardW as the aggregate risk of (Xt)t∈T, rather
than that of (Yt)t∈T, at a negligible cost.
We assume that the intertemporal preferences of the agent is described by the
time-dependent utility function ut(x). This means that a rational choice of the
agent’s allocation (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) is based on the integrated expected utility∑
t∈TE[ut(Y˜t)]. Throughout §2, we assume that the utility function ut(x) satisfies
the following condition:
(2.1)
{
for t ∈ T, R ∋ x 7→ ut(x) ∈ R is a strictly concave, C1-class function
such that u′t(x) := (dut/dx)(x) > 0 for x ∈ R.
Using ut(x), we define the utility U(W ) ∈ R ∪ {+∞} of the risk W ∈ L∞ by (U).
Definition 2.3. An intertemporal risk allocation (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) of the risk
W ∈ L∞ is optimal if it attains the supremum in (U).
In other words, (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) is optimal if it solves the following problem:
(P) Maximize
∑
t∈T
E[ut(Y˜t)] among all (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W ).
Proposition 2.4. The optimal intertemporal risk allocation (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) of
W ∈ L∞ is unique if it exists.
Proof. Suppose that there are two distinct optimal intertemporal allocations (Xt)
and (Yt) of W . If we put Zt := (1/2)Xt + (1/2)Yt for t ∈ T, then (Zt) is also in
A(W ). However, concavity of ut(·) yields∑
t∈T
E[ut(Z˜t)] >
∑
t∈T
E[(1/2)ut(X˜t) + (1/2)ut(Y˜t)] = U(W ),
which is a contradiction. Thus the optimal allocation of W is unique. 
2.2. Indifference pricing. In this section, we assume that U(W ) < ∞ for all
W ∈ L∞. This condition holds, for example, if ut(x) is bounded from above. This
also holds if the optimal intertemporal risk allocation exists for all W ∈ L∞. We
thus have the utility functional U : L∞ → R. We write w ∈ R for the initial wealth
of the agent.
Proposition 2.5. The functional U has the following properties for W,Z ∈ L∞.
(a) Strict Monotonicity: If W ≥ Z a.s. and P (W > Z) > 0, then U(W ) >
U(Z).
(b) Concavity: If a ∈ [0, 1], then U(aW + (1− a)Z) ≥ aU(W ) + (1− a)U(Z).
Proof. (a) For (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(Z), we define (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) by
Xt =
{
Yt, t 6= T,
YT +BT (W − Z), t = T.
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Choosing m > 0 so that max(|W |, |Z|) ≤ m a.s., we define c := inf |y|≤m u′T (y).
Then, by (2.1), c > 0. Since uT (X˜T ) ≥ uT (Y˜T ) + c(W − Z), we have
U(W ) ≥
∑
t∈T
E[ut(X˜t)] ≥
∑
t∈T
E[ut(Y˜t)] + cE[W − Z].
The property (a) follows from this.
(b) The property (b) follows easily from the concavity of ut, t ∈ T. 
From Proposition 2.5, we see that for Z ∈ L∞, the function g : R → R defined
by g(x) := U(w + x − Z) is concave (whence continuous) and strictly increasing.
Moreover, since Z is bounded, we have U(w + x − Z) < U(w) for x small enough
and U(w + x − Z) > U(w) for x large enough. We are thus led to the following
definition.
Definition 2.6. We define the indifference price H(Z) = H(Z;w) ∈ R of Z ∈ L∞
by U(w +H(Z)− Z) = U(w).
From Proposition 2.5, we immediately obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 2.7. The indifference price functional H : L∞ → R has the following
propertites for W,Z ∈ L∞.
(a) Strict Monotonicity: If W ≥ Z a.s. and P (W > Z) > 0, then H(W ) >
H(Z).
(b) Convexity: If a ∈ [0, 1], then H(aW +(1− a)Z) ≤ aH(W )+ (1− a)H(Z).
2.3. Characterization by the first order condition. It should be noticed that,
in general, the optimal intertemporal risk allocation may not exist. However, to
precisely investigate the utility U(·), whence the indifference price H(·), it seems
indispensable to find and describe the optimal intertemporal risk allocation. In this
section, we show that the condition (FO) is necessary and sufficient for (Xt) ∈ A(W )
to be optimal. This characterization plays a key role in this paper. In the proof
below, and throughout the paper, we write
Et[Y ] := E[Y |Ft], Y ∈ L1(Ω,F , P ), t ∈ T.
Here is the characterization of the optimality.
Theorem 2.8. For W ∈ L∞ and (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ), the following conditions are
equivalent:
(a) (Xt)t∈T is optimal.
(b) The condition (FO) is satisfied.
Proof. First, we prove (a) ⇒ (b). Let (Xt) ∈ A(W ) be the optimal allocation.
Choose k,m ∈ T so that k < m, and put, for t ∈ T, y ∈ R and A ∈ Fk,
Xt(y) =


Xm + yBm1A, t = m,
Xk − yBk1A, t = k,
Xt, otherwise.
Then,
∑
t∈T X˜t(y) = W , so that (Xt(y))t∈T ∈ A(W ). Since (Xt(0)) = (Xt) is
optimal, the function f defined by f(y) :=
∑
t∈TE[ut(X˜t(y))] takes the maximal
value at y = 0. Thus f ′(0) = 0 or E[{u′m(X˜m) − u′k(X˜k)}1A] = 0, which implies
that (u′t(X˜t)) is an (Ft)-martingale.
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Next, we prove (b) ⇒ (a). Assume that (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) and that (u′t(X˜t))t∈T
is an (Ft)-martingale. By concavity of ut(·), we have ut(y) ≤ ut(x) + u′t(x)(y − x)
for x, y ∈ R, so that for any Y = (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W ),∑
t∈T
ut(Y˜t) ≤
∑
t∈T
ut(X˜t) +
∑
t∈T
u′t(X˜t)(Y˜t − X˜t).
Since (u′t(X˜t)) is an (Ft)-martingale and both (Xt) and (Yt) are in A(W ), we see
that
E
[∑
t∈T
u′t(X˜t)(Y˜t − X˜t)
]
=
∑
t∈T
E
[
Et[u
′
T (X˜T )](Y˜t − X˜t)
]
=
∑
t∈T
E
[
u′T (X˜T )(Y˜t − X˜t)
]
= E
[
u′T (X˜T )
∑
t∈T
(Y˜t − X˜t)
]
= E
[
u′T (X˜T )(W −W )
]
= 0.
Combining,
∑
t∈TE[ut(Y˜t)] ≤
∑
t∈TE[ut(X˜t)]. Thus, (Xt) is optimal. 
Remark 2.9. We clearly find similarity between the theorem above and Borch’s
theorem which characterizes (classical) Pareto optimality by a first order condition
(see Borch [5, 6, 7]; see also Gerber and Pafumi [20]).
2.4. Pareto optima. In this section, we introduce Pareto optimality of intertem-
poral risk allocations. It is closely related to the optimality introduced above.
Definition 2.10. For W ∈ L∞, the allocation (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) is Pareto optimal
if there does not exist (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) satisfying the following two conditions:
(a) E[ut(Y˜t)] ≥ E[ut(X˜t)] for all t ∈ T.
(b) E[ut0(Y˜t0)] > E[ut0(X˜t0)] for at least one t0 ∈ T.
For λ = (λ1, . . . , λT ) ∈ RT+ \ {0}, we consider the following problem:
(Pλ) Maximize
∑
t∈T
λtE[ut(Y˜t)] among all (Yt)t∈T ∈ A(W ).
Lemma 2.11. Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λT ) ∈ RT+ \ {0}.
(a) If (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) is the solution to Problem Pλ, then (λtu′t(X˜t))t∈T is
an (Ft)-martingale.
(b) If Problem Pλ has a solution, then λ ∈ (0,∞)T .
Proof. The proof of (a) is almost the same as that of the implication (a) ⇒ (b) in
Theorem 2.8, whence we omit it.
We prove (b). Assume that λk = 0 for k ∈ T, and choose m so that λm > 0.
If Problem Pλ has a solution (Xt) ∈ A(W ), then, by (a), (λtu′t(X˜t)) is an (Ft)-
martingale. However, since λku
′
k(X˜k) = 0 and λmu
′
m(X˜m) > 0, this can never be
the case. Thus, (b) follows. 
Proposition 2.12. Let λ ∈ (0,∞)T . Then the solution (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) to Prob-
lem Pλ is unique if exists.
The proof is almost the same as that of Proposition 2.4, whence we omit it.
The next theorem is an analogue of the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics.
Theorem 2.13. For (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ), the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) (Xt)t∈T is Pareto optimal.
6
(b) There exists λ ∈ (0,∞)T such that (Xt)t∈T solves Problem Pλ.
Proof. (b)⇒ (a). If (Xt)t∈T is not Pareto optimal, then clearly it is not the solution
to Problem Pλ for any λ ∈ (0,∞)T .
(a) ⇒ (b). We define f(Y ) := φ(X)− φ(Y ) for Y ∈ A(W ), where
φ(Y ) :=
(
E[u1(Y˜1)], . . . , E[uT (Y˜T )]
)
.
Then f : A(W )→ RT is RT+-convex: for p ∈ (0, 1) and Y, Y ′ ∈ A(W ),
pf(Y ) + (1− p)f(Y ′)− f(pY + (1− p)Y ′) ∈ RT+.
If X ∈ A(W ) is Pareto optimal, then −f(Y ) /∈ (0,∞)T for Y ∈ A(W ). Hence,
by Gordan’s Alternative Theorem (see, e.g., Craven [12], Chapter 2), there exists
λ ∈ RT+, λ 6= 0, such that
λ · f(Y ) = λ · [φ(X)− φ(Y )] ≥ 0, Y ∈ A(W ),
which implies that X is the solution to Problem Pλ. Finally, Lemma 2.11 gives
λ ∈ (0,∞)T . 
By Theorem 2.13, we see that the set of Pareto optimal intertemporal risk al-
locations in A(W ) is parametrized by the T − 1 parameters (λ2/λ1, . . . , λT /λ1) ∈
(0,∞)T−1. We also see that the Pareto optimal allocation (Xt) ∈ A(W ) cor-
responding to Problem (Pλ) with λ = (λ1, . . . , λT ) is optimal with respect to the
intertemporal preferences described by the utility function vt(x) := λtut(x). There-
fore, from Theorem 2.8, we immediately obtain the next characterization of Pareto
optimality.
Theorem 2.14. For W ∈ L∞ and (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ), the following conditions are
equivalent:
(a) (Xt)t∈T is Pareto optimal.
(b) There exists (λ1, . . . , λT ) ∈ (0,∞)T such that the process (λtu′t(X˜t))t∈T is
an (Ft)-martingale.
3. Exponential utility
Let (rt)t∈T and (Bt)t∈T be as in Section 2. In this section, we adopt the following
time-dependent exponential utility function:
(EU)

ut(x) =
1
αt
[1− exp (−αtx)] , t ∈ T, x ∈ R
with α := (α1, . . . , αt) ∈ (0,∞)T .
In what follows, we may also write α(t) = αt. We have
(3.1) u′t(x) = exp (−αtx) , ut(0) = 0, u′t(0) = 1.
3.1. The optimal allocation for the exponential utility. In this section, we
describe the optimal intertemporal risk allocation for the exponential utility func-
tion ut(x) in (EU). Thus, the problem that we consider here is Problem (P) for
ut(x) in (EU).
To derive the optimal allocation (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) or the solution to (P), we
consider the transform Mt = exp(−αtX˜t) for t ∈ T. Then, by Theorem 2.8,
Problem (P) reduces to
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Problem M. For W ∈ L∞ and α = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ (0,∞)T , derive a positive
(Ft)-martingale (Mt)t∈T satisfying
(3.2)
∏
t∈T
M
1/α(t)
t = exp(−W ) a.s.
For W ∈ L∞ and α = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ (0,∞)T , we define the adapted process
(Lt(α,W ))t∈T by the following backward iteration:
(L1)
{
LT (α,W ) := exp(−αTW ),
Lt−1(α,W ) := Et−1[Lt(α,W )]
β(t−1)/β(t), t = 2, . . . , T,
where Et[Y ] := E[Y |Ft] as before, and we define βt, or β(t), in (0,∞) by
(β)
1
βt
=
T∑
k=t
1
αk
, t ∈ T.
Notice that for all t ∈ T, Lt(α,W ) is bounded away from 0 and ∞. We also define
the adapted process (Mt(α,W ))t∈T by
(M)
{
Mt(α,W ) = Lt(α,W ) ·
∏t−1
k=1 Lk(α,W )
−β(k+1)/α(k), t = 2, . . . , T,
M1(α,W ) = L1(α,W ).
Here is the solution to the martingale problem M above.
Theorem 3.1. ForW ∈ L∞ and α = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ (0,∞)T , the solution (Mt)t∈T
to Problem M is unique and given by Mt =Mt(α,W ) for t ∈ T.
Proof. For simplicity, we write Lt = Lt(α,W ) for t ∈ T.
Step 1. Let t ≥ 3. Since ∏t−1k=1 L−β(k+1)/α(k)k is Ft−1-measurable, the process
(Mt)t∈T defined by Mt =Mt(α,W ) satisfies
Et−1[Mt] = Et−1[Lt] ·
∏t−1
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k .
However, since Et−1[Lt] = L
β(t)/β(t−1)
t−1 , we get
Et−1[Mt] = L
β(t)/β(t−1)
t−1 · L−β(t)/α(t−1)t−1 ·
∏t−2
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k
= Lt−1 ·
∏t−2
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k =Mt.
Treating the case t = 2 similarly, we see that (Mt) is an (Ft)-martingale. Also,∏
t∈T
M
1/α(t)
t = L
1/α(1)
1 ·
∏T
t=2
L
1/α(t)
t
(∏t−1
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/{α(k)α(t)}
k
)
=
[∏
t∈T
L
1/α(t)
t
]
·
[∏T
t=2
∏t
k=2
L
−β(k)/{α(k−1)α(t)}
k−1
]
=
[∏
t∈T
L
1/α(t)
t
]
·
[∏T
k=2
(∏T
t=k
L
−1/α(t)
k−1
)−β(k)/α(k−1)]
=
[∏
t∈T
L
1/α(t)
t
]
·
[∏T
k=2
L
−1/α(k−1)
k−1
]
= L
1/α(T )
T ,
yielding (3.2). Thus (Mt) is a solution to Problem M.
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Step 2. We show the uniqueness. Assume that (Mt)t∈T is a solution to Problem
M. Then,
(3.3)
[∏T−2
k=1
M
1/α(k)
k
]
·M1/β(T−1)T−1 = ET−1[LT ]1/α(T ).
From this, we have the decomposition
(3.4) MT−1 = LT−1 ·NT−2,
where NT−2 is an FT−2-measurable random variable. We see that NT−2 satisfies[∏T−2
k=1
M
1/α(k)
k
]
·N1/β(T−1)T−2 = 1.
However,
MT−2 = ET−2[MT−1] = ET−2[LT−1] ·NT−2 = Lβ(T−1)/β(T−2)T−2 ·NT−2,
so that [∏T−3
k=1
M
1/α(k)
k
]
·N1/β(T−2)T−2 = L−β(T−1)/{α(T−2)β(T−2)}T−2 .
Thus, NT−2 also has the decomposition
NT−2 = L
−β(T−1)/α(T−2)
T−2 ·NT−3,
where NT−3 is FT−3-measurable. Moreover, this and (3.4) give
(3.5) MT−1 = LT−1 · L−β(T−1)/α(T−2)T−2 ·NT−3.
The random variable NT−3 satisfies[∏T−3
k=1
M
1/α(k)
k
]
·N1/β(T−2)T−3 = 1.
However, from
ET−2[LT−1] = L
β(T−1)/β(T−2)
T−2 ,
ET−3[LT−2] = L
β(T−2)/β(T−3)
T−3 ,
we find that
MT−3 = ET−3[MT−1] = ET−3[LT−1 · L−β(T−1)/α(T−2)T−2 ] ·NT−3
= ET−3[ET−2[LT−1] · L−β(T−1)/α(T−2)T−2 ] ·NT−3
= ET−3[LT−2] ·NT−3 = Lβ(T−2)/β(T−3)T−3 ·NT−3.
Therefore, [∏T−4
k=1
M
1/α(k)
k
]
·N1/β(T−3)T−3 = L−β(T−2)/{α(T−3)β(T−3)}T−3 ,
so that NT−3 has the decomposition
NT−3 = L
−β(T−2)/α(T−3)
T−3 ·NT−4,
where NT−4 is FT−4-measurable. Moreover, from this and (3.5), we get
MT−1 = LT−1 · L−β(T−1)/α(T−2)T−2 · L−β(T−2)/α(T−3)T−3 ·NT−4.
Repeating the arguments above, we finally obtain
MT−1 = LT−1 ·
∏T−2
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k .
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On the other hand, we find from (3.2) and (3.3) that
MT =
MT−1 · LT
ET−1[LT ]
.
Moreover, ET−1[LT ] = L
α(T )/β(T−1)
T−1 . Combining,
MT = LT · L−α(T )/β(T−1)T−1 ·MT−1
= LT · L−α(T )/β(T−1)T−1 · LT−1 ·
∏T−2
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k
= LT ·
∏T−1
k=1
L
−β(k+1)/α(k)
k .
Thus MT coincides with MT (α,W ). However, since both (Mt) and (Mt(α,W ))
are (Ft)-martingales, this implies that the two processes are identical. Thus the
solution to Problem M is unique. 
The next theorem follows immediately from Theorems 2.8 and 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal intertemporal risk allocation (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(W ) of W ∈
L∞ for the exponential utility function ut(x) in (EU) is unique and given by
(3.6) exp(−αtX˜t) =Mt(α,W ), t ∈ T.
We need the next proposition later.
Proposition 3.3. Let x ∈ R, Z ∈ L∞ and α = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ (0,∞)T . Then, the
following assertions hold:
(a) Lt(α, x) = exp(−βtx) for t ∈ T.
(b) Lt(α, x − Z) = exp(−βtx)Lt(α,−Z) for t ∈ T.
Proof. The assertion (a) follows immediately from the definition of (Lt(α, x)). If
we put L′t := exp(−βtx)Lt(α,−Z) for t ∈ T, then (L′t)t∈T satisfies{
L′T = exp [−αT (x − Z)] ,
L′t−1 = Et−1[L
′
t]
β(t−1)/β(t), t = 2, . . . , T,
whence L′t = Lt(α, x − Z) for t ∈ T or (b). 
3.2. The indifference prices for the exponential utility. In this section, we
derive the indifference prices for the exponential utility ut(x) in (EU). Let U,H :
L∞ → R be the utility and indifference price functionals defined from ut(x) as
above, respectively. Recall βt, Lt(α,Z) and Mt(α,Z) from Section 3.1.
For the exponential utility, the next theorem reduces the computation of the
indifference price H(Z) to that of L1(α,−Z).
Theorem 3.4. We assume (EU). Then, for x ∈ R and Z ∈ L∞, the following
assertions hold:
(a) U(Z) =
1
β1
{1− E[L1(α,Z)]}.
(b) U(x− Z) = 1
β1
{1− exp(−β1x) ·E[L1(α,−Z)]}.
(c) H(Z) =
1
β1
logE[L1(α,−Z)].
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Proof. Define (Xt)t∈T ∈ A(Z) by (3.6) with W = Z. Then, by Theorem 3.2, the
supremum in (U) is attained by (Xt). Since (Mt(α,Z))t∈T is an (Ft)-martingale
and M1(α,Z) = L1(α,Z), we have
U(Z) =
∑
t∈T
1
αt
E[1 − exp(−αtX˜t)] =
∑
t∈T
1
αt
E[1 −Mt(α,Z)]
= {1− E[M1(α,Z)]}
∑
t∈T
1
αt
=
1
β1
{1− E[L1(α,Z)]}.
Thus (a) follows. The assertion (b) follows from (a) and Proposition 3.3 (b). Finally,
(c) follows from (a), (b) and Proposition 3.3 (a). 
From Theorem 3.4 (c), we see that the indifference price H(Z) does not depend
on the level w of the initial wealth for the exponential utility function.
The next proposition describes the optimal intertemporal allocation of the selling
position w +H(Z)− Z for the exponential utility.
Proposition 3.5. We assume (EU). For x ∈ R and Z ∈ L∞, let (Xt) ∈ A(x−Z)
be the optimal intertemporal allocation of x−Z: ∑t∈TE[ut(X˜t)] = U(x−Z). Then,
(Xt)t∈T is given by
X1 =
B1
α1
[β1x− logL1(α,−Z)] ,
Xt =
Bt
αt
[
β1x− logLt(α,−Z) +
t−1∑
k=1
βk+1
αk
logLk(α,−Z)
]
, t = 2, . . . , T.
Proof. Let t ≥ 2 (the case t = 1 can be treated similarly). By Theorem 3.2 and
Proposition 3.3, the optimal intertemporal allocation (Xt) of x− Z satisfies
e−αtXt/Bt =Mt(α, x − Z) = Lt(α, x − Z) ·
∏t−1
k=1
Lk(α, x− Z)−β(k+1)/α(k)
= e−β(t)x
∏t−1
k=1
(
e−β(k)x
)−β(k+1)/α(k)
× Lt(α,−Z) ·
∏t−1
k=1
Lk(α,−Z)−β(k+1)/α(k),
whence
αt
Bt
Xt =
{
βt −
∑t−1
k=1
βkβk+1
αk
}
x
− logLt(α,−Z) +
∑t−1
k=1
βk+1
αk
logLk(α,−Z).
However, by simple calculation, we see that
βt −
∑t−1
k=1
βkβk+1
αk
= β1.
Thus, the proposition follows. 
4. Insurance pricing
In this section, we apply the approach above to the computation of insurance
premiums.
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4.1. Life insurance contract. We consider a life insurance contract with duration
T in which the insurer pays the insured ct dollars at time t ∈ T if the insured dies
in the interval (t − 1, t]. Here ct’s are deterministic. The insured pays the insurer
a one-time premium at time t = 0.
We denote by τ the future life time of the insured, i.e., she/he dies at time τ . We
assume that τ is a random variable on (Ω,F , P ) satisfying τ(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω
and P (τ = t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞).
If the insured pays the insurer H dollars as one time premium at time t = 0,
then the present value of the cashflow of the insurer is given by H − Z with
Z =
∑
t∈T
c˜t1(t−1<τ≤t), c˜t := ct/Bt for t ∈ T.
In the traditional pricing, the premium H0(Z) based on the principle of equiv-
alence is often used: H0(Z) is defined by E[H0(Z) − Z] = 0 or H0(Z) = E[Z]. If
the interest rates are deterministic, H0(Z) is given by
H0(Z) =
∑
t∈T
c˜tP (t− 1 < τ ≤ t).
Notice that this price lacks the safety loading if the real mortality table is used.
Usually, insurance companies use modified mortality tables to ensure the necessary
safety loading (see §4.4 below).
We define a discrete-time process (Dt)t∈T by
Dt := 1(τ≤t), t = 0, 1, . . . , T.
Then, (Dt)t∈T is a {0, 1}-valued nondecreasing process with D0 = 0. Notice that
for t ∈ T, Dt = 0 (resp., Dt = 1) if and only if the insurer is alive (resp., dead) at
time t. We denote by (Ht)t∈T the filtration associated with the process (Dt)t∈{0}∪T:
(4.1) Ht := σ(Ds : s = 0, . . . , t), t = 0, 1, . . . , T.
We consider the following conditional probabilities:
qt := P (τ ≤ t+ 1 | τ > t), t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
pt := 1− qt = P (τ > t+ 1 | τ > t), t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
We have the following equalities:
qt + pt = 1 (t = 0, . . . , T − 1), q0 = P (τ ≤ 1), p0 = P (1 < τ).
We use the following well-known result.
Lemma 4.1. The following assertions hold:
(a) E[Dt| Ht−1] = Dt−1 + (1−Dt−1)qt−1 for t ∈ T.
(b) E[ (1 −Dt)| Ht−1] = (1−Dt−1)pt−1 for t ∈ T.
4.2. Algorithm for the premium computation. The aim of this section is
to derive an algorithm to compute the indifference premium of the life insurance
contract. To this end, in addition to (EU), we assume the following conditions:
The interest rate process (rt)t∈T is deterministic.(R)
The filtration (Ft)t∈{0}∪T is given by (Ht)t∈{0}∪T in (4.1).(F)
The condition (R) implies that the riskless bond price process (Bt)t∈T is also de-
terministic.
The σ-algebra FT is generated by the followng decomposition of Ω:
Ω = (0 < τ ≤ 1) ∪ (1 < τ ≤ 2) ∪ · · · ∪ (T − 1 < τ ≤ T ) ∪ (T < τ).
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Hence, if Z ∈ L∞(Ω,FT , P ), then Z has the decomposition of the form
(Z) Z =
T∑
t=1
zt1(t−1<τ≤t) + zT+11(T<τ)
with some real deterministic coefficients zt, t = 1, . . . , T+1. We also write z(t) = zt.
For example, in the life insurance contract considered in the previous section, we
have zt = c˜t for t = 1, . . . , T and zT+1 = 0.
Recall βt from (β). For Z ∈ L∞ with representation (Z), we define the real
deterministic sequence (ht)
T
t=0 by the following backward iteration:
(h)


hT = e
z(T+1),
ht−1 =
[
eβ(t)z(t)qt−1 + h
β(t)
t pt−1
]1/β(t)
, t = 1. . . . , T.
Recall the definition of the process (Lt(α,−Z))t∈T from Section 2.
Proposition 4.2. We assume (EU), (R) and (F). Then, for Z ∈ L∞ with (Z),
the process (Lt(α,−Z))t∈T is given by
(L2)


L1(α,−Z) = eβ(1)z(1)D1 + hβ(1)1 (1−D1),
Lt(α,−Z) = exp
[
βt
∑t−1
s=1{zs − zs+1}Ds
]
×
[
eβ(t)z(t)Dt + h
β(t)
t (1−Dt)
]
, t = 2, . . . , T.
Proof. For simplicity, we write Lt = Lt(α,−Z). Since
1(t−1<τ≤t) = Dt −Dt−1 (t = 1, . . . , T ), 1(T<τ) = 1−DT ,
we have
(4.2) Z =
T−1∑
t=1
{zt − zt+1}Dt + zTDT + zT+1(1 −DT ).
To prove (L2), we use backward mathematical induction with respect to t.
First, if t = T , then from (4.2),
LT = exp
[
βT
∑T−1
t=1
{zt − zt+1}Dt
]
· exp [βT {zTDT + zT+1(1−DT )}] .
However, since DT is either 1 or 0 and hT = exp(zT+1), we have
exp [βT {zTDT + zT+1(1 −DT )}] = eβ(T )z(T )DT + hβ(T )T (1−DT ),
which implies (L2) with t = T .
Next, we assume that (L2) holds for t ∈ {2, . . . , T }. Then,
Et−1[Lt] = exp
[
βt
∑t−1
s=1
{zs − zs+1}Ds
]
·Et−1
[
eβ(t)z(t)Dt + h
β(t)
t (1−Dt)
]
,
where, as before, we write Et[X ] for E[X |Ft]. By Lemma 4.1,
Et−1
[
eβ(t)z(t)Dt + h
β(t)
t (1−Dt)
]
= eβ(t)z(t){Dt−1 + (1−Dt−1)qt−1}+ hβ(t)t (1−Dt−1)pt−1
= eβ(t)z(t)Dt−1 +
[
eβ(t)z(t)qt−1 + h
β(t)
t pt−1
]
(1−Dt−1)
= eβ(t)z(t)Dt−1 + h
β(t)
t−1 (1−Dt−1).
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Hence, noting that Dt−1 is either 1 or 0, we obtain
Lt−1 = Et−1[Lt]
β(t−1)/β(t)
= exp
[
βt−1
∑t−1
s=1
{zs − zs+1}Ds
]
×
[
eβ(t−1)z(t)Dt−1 + h
β(t−1)
t−1 (1−Dt−1)
]
= exp
[
βt−1
∑t−2
s=1
{zs − zs+1}Ds
]
×
[
eβ(t−1)z(t−1)Dt−1 + h
β(t−1)
t−1 (1−Dt−1)
]
,
which implies (L2) with t− 1. Thus, (L2) holds for t ≥ 1. 
We are ready to give the algorithms to compute the indifference premium H(Z)
and corresponding optimal allocation of the selling position w+H(Z)−Z. We see
that the computations are reduced to those of ht, t = 0, . . . , T , in (h).
Theorem 4.3. We assume (EU), (R) and (F). Let Z ∈ L∞ with representation
(Z). Then, the following assertions hold.
(a) The indifference price H(Z) is given by H(Z) = log h0.
(b) Let (Xt) ∈ A(w + H(Z) − Z) be the optimal intertemporal allocation of
w + H(Z) − Z: ∑t∈TE[ut(X˜t)] = U(w + H(Z) − Z) = U(w). Then,
(Xt)t∈T is given by
X1 =
B1
α1
[
β1(w +H(Z))− β1z1 · 1(0<τ≤1) − β1 log h1 · 1(1<τ)
]
,
Xt =
Bt
αt
[
β1(w +H(Z))−
t∑
k=1
βkzk · 1(k−1<τ≤k) − βt log ht · 1(t<τ)
+
t−1∑
k=1
βk+1
αk
βk log hk · 1(k<τ)
]
, t = 2, . . . , T.
Proof. (a) Since E[D1] = q0 and E[1 − D1] = p0, it follows from Proposition 4.2
that
E[L1(α,−Z)] = eβ(1)z(1)q0 + hβ(1)1 p0 = hβ(1)0 .
The assertion (a) follows from this and Theorem 3.4 (c).
(b) From Proposition 4.2,
logL1(α,−Z) = β1z1 · 1(0<τ≤1) + β1 log h1 · 1(1<τ)
and, for t = 2, . . . , T ,
logLt(α,−Z) = βt
[∑t−1
s=1
{zs − zs+1} ·Ds + zt ·Dt
]
+ βt log ht · (1−Dt),
= βt
[∑t
s=1
zs · 1(s−1<τ≤s)
]
+ βt log ht · 1(t<τ).
We see that
βt −
t−1∑
k=s
βk+1βk
αk
= βs, 1 ≤ s < t ≤ T.
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Hence, we have, for t = 2, . . . , T ,
logLt(α,−Z)−
t−1∑
k=1
βk+1
αk
logLk(α,−Z)
= βt log ht · 1(t<τ) −
t−1∑
s=1
βs+1
αs
βs log hs · 1(s<τ)
+ βt
[∑t
s=1
zs · 1(s−1<τ≤s)
]
−
t−1∑
k=1
βk+1
αk
βk
[∑k
s=1
zs · 1(s−1<τ≤s)
]
= βt log ht · 1(t<τ) −
t−1∑
s=1
βs+1
αs
βs log hs · 1(s<τ)
+ βtzt · 1(t−1<τ≤t) +
t−1∑
s=1
[
βt −
∑t−1
k=s
βk+1
αk
βk
]
zs · 1(s−1<τ≤s)
= βt log ht · 1(t<τ) −
t−1∑
s=1
βs+1
αs
βs log hs · 1(s<τ) +
t∑
s=1
βszs · 1(s−1<τ≤s).
This and Proposition 3.5 yield the assertion (b) with t = 2, . . . , T . We can prove
the case t = 1 in the same way. 
Remark 4.4. In the premium calcluation method in Theorem 4.3, we have assumed
that the interest rate process (rt)t∈T is deterministic (the condition (R)). If instead
we assume, e.g., that (rt)t∈T is a Markovian processs that is independent of τ ,
then we obtain a similar pricing method that involves the transition probabilities
of (rt)t∈T. Such extensions to the case of random-interest-rate will be reported
elsewhere.
4.3. Dependence on the risk aversion coefficients. As in the previous section,
we assume (EU), (R) and (F). The aim of this section is to investigate the depen-
dence of the indifference price H(Z) on the absolute risk aversion coefficient set
α = (α1, . . . , αt) ∈ (0,∞)T . To emphasize the dependence on α, we write ut(x;α),
Uα(Z), Hα(Z) and ht(α) for the exponential utility function ut(x), utility U(Z),
indifference price H(Z) and ht in (h), respectively. In what follows, α→ 0+ (resp.,
α→∞) means that αt → +0 (resp., αt →∞) for all t ∈ T.
To study the asymptotic behavior ofHα(Z) as α→ 0+, we need the next lemma.
Lemma 4.5. For z ∈ R, q ∈ [0, 1], and g : (0,∞) → (0,∞) with limit c :=
limx→0+ log g(x) ∈ R, we define f(x) := [qezx + (1 − q)g(x)x]1/x for x > 0. Then,
lim
x→0+
log f(x) = qz + (1− q)c.
Proof. Take ε > 0. If x is positive and sufficiently close to 0, then
1
x
log
[
qezx + (1− q)e(c−ε)x
]
≤ log f(x) ≤ 1
x
log
[
qezx + (1− q)e(c+ε)x
]
,
which yields
qz + (1 − q)(c− ε) ≤ lim inf
x→0+
log f(x) ≤ lim sup
x→0+
log f(x) ≤ qz + (1− q)(c+ ε).
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, the lemma follows. 
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For Z ∈ L∞ with representation (Z), we have
E[Z] =
T∑
t=1
ztP (t− 1 < τ ≤ t) + zT+1P (T < τ).
We define H∞(Z) by
H∞(Z) := max{z1, . . . , zT+1}.
We can view E[Z] (resp., H∞(Z)) as a lower (resp., upper) bound for any reason-
able price of Z. From the next theorem, we see that Hα(Z) takes any value in
(E[Z], H∞(Z)) by a suitable choice of α ∈ (0,∞)T .
Theorem 4.6. We assume (EU), (R) and (F). We also assume 0 < qt < 1 for all
t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Then, for Z ∈ L∞, the following assertions hold:
(a) E[Z] ≤ Hα(Z) ≤ H∞(Z) for all α ∈ (0,∞)T .
(b) lim
α→0+
Hα(Z) = E[Z].
(c) lim
α→∞
Hα(Z) = H∞(Z).
(d) For every pi ∈ (E[Z], H∞(Z)) and α = (α1, . . . , αT ) ∈ (0,∞)T , there exists
p ∈ (0,∞) such that pi = Hpα(Z), where pα := (pα1, . . . , pαT ).
Proof. (a) By (3.1), we have ut(x;α) ≤ x. Hence, for W ∈ L∞,
Uα(W ) = sup
{∑T
t=1
E[ut(X˜t, α)] : (Xt) ∈ A(W )
}
≤ sup
{
E
[∑T
t=1
X˜t
]
: (Xt) ∈ A(W )
}
= E[W ],
which implies 0 = Uα(Hα(Z)− Z) ≤ E[Hα(Z)− Z] or E[Z] ≤ Hα(Z).
By (h), we have hT (α) ≤ exp[H∞(Z)]. Moreover, if ht(α) ≤ exp[H∞(Z)], then
ht−1(α) ≤
[
qt−1e
β(t)H∞(Z) + pt−1e
β(t)H∞(Z)
]1/β(t)
= eH∞(Z).
Thus we finally see that hα(0) ≤ exp[H∞(Z)]. This and Theorem 4.3 (a) give
Hα(Z) ≤ H∞(Z).
(b) We have β → 0+ as α→ 0+. Hence, by applying Lemma 4.5 iterately to
ht−1(α) =
[
eβ(t)z(t)qt−1 + ht(α)
β(t)pt−1
]1/β(t)
, t = 1. . . . , T,
with x = βt, q = qt−1, z = zt, and g(x) = ht(α), we see the existence of the limits
ht(0) := limα→0+ ht(α), t = 0, . . . , T , satisfying{
log hT (0) = zT+1,
log ht−1(0) = qt−1zt + pt−1 log ht(0), t = 1, . . . , T.
From this, we get
log h0(0) = q0z1 +
∑T−1
t=1
(∏t−1
s=0
ps
)
qtzt+1 +
(∏T−1
s=0
ps
)
zT+1.
However, we have q0 = P (0 < τ ≤ 1),
p0q1 = P (τ > 1)P (τ ≤ 2|τ > 1) = P (1 < τ ≤ 2),
and more generally,(∏t−1
s=0
ps
)
qt = P (t < τ ≤ t+ 1), t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
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We also have
∏T−1
s=0 ps = P (T < τ). Thus
log h0(0) =
T∑
t=1
ztP (t− 1 < τ ≤ t) + zT+1P (T < τ) = E[Z]
or
lim
α→0+
Hα(Z) = lim
α→0+
log h0(α) = E[Z].
(c) Let H∞(Z) = zt0 with t0 ∈ {1, . . . , T + 1}. If t0 ≥ 2, then
ht0−1(α) =
[
qt0−1e
β(t0)H∞(Z) + pt0−1ht0(α)
β(t0)
]1/β(t)
≥ q1/β(t0)t0−1 eH∞(Z),
which, together with (h), gives
ht0−2(α) ≥ p1/β(t0−1)t0−2 ht0−1(α) ≥ p
1/β(t0−1)
t0−2
q
1/β(t0)
t0−1
eH∞(Z).
Repeating this argument, we finally obtain
h0(α) ≥
(∏t0−2
s=0
p1/β(s+1)s
)
q
1/β(t0)
t0−1
eH∞(Z).
Similarly, if t0 = 1, then h0(α) ≥ q1/β(1)0 eH∞(Z). Therefore, since β → ∞ as
α→∞, we obtain
lim inf
α→∞
Hα(Z) = lim inf
α→∞
log h0(α) ≥ H∞(Z).
However, Hα(Z) ≤ H∞(Z) by (a), so that limα→∞Hα(Z) = H∞(Z).
(d) By the construction in (h), h0(α), whence Hα(Z) = log h0(α), is continuous
in α ∈ (0,∞)T . Therefore, the assertion (d) follows from (a)–(c). 
4.4. Numerical examples. We compare the indifference pricing method in The-
orem 4.3 with traditional ones by applying them to the following same insurance
contract:
• Type of insurance: term mortality insurance.
• Age at issue: 30 years old.
• Sex: male.
• Term of contract: from 1 year to 30 years.
• Loading of premium: excluded.
• Mortality rate: Standard Mortality Table 2007 for mortality insurance
(made by the Institute of Actuaries of Japan).
• Discount rate: 2%.
• Payment method: annual payment.
• Sum assured: 1 (during the entire contract term).
By using the notation in the previous sections, the aggregate risk Z of this contract
becomes
Z =
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + 0.02)t
1(t−1<τ≤t).
The traditional pricing methods that we use here are as follows:
(1) Traditional method without risk loading:
The premium TP1(T ) =
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + 0.02)t
P (t− 1 < τ ≤ t).
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(2) Traditional method with risk loading:
The premium TP2(T ) =
T∑
t=1
1
(1 + 0.02)t
Q′t,
where Q′t := Qt + 0.01× {Qt(1−Qt)}1/2 with Qt := P (t− 1 < τ ≤ t).
As above, we write TP1(T ) and TP2(T ) for the premiums of the contract with T
years of term obtained by the traditional pricing methods (1) and (2), respectively.
For the values a = 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5, we denote by IPa(T ) the premium of the
same contract obtained by the indifference pricing method in Theorem 4.3 with
α(t) ≡ a. We also write IPfit(T ) for the premium of the same contract calculated
by the pricing method in Theorem 4.3 with α(t) = 0.6+ 0.36
√
t, the form of which
is chosen to fit the graph of the indifference prices to that of TP2. We used the
nonlinear least-squares to determine the form of α(t) for IPfit(T ).
In Figures 4.1–4.3, we plot the graphs of TP1, TP2, IPa, and IPfit. We see
that the fitted premiums IPfit(T ) simultaneously approximate the corresponding
traditional prices TP2(T ) well. We have repeated this procedure for various prices
and obtained good fits in most cases. This observation suggests the following implied
utility approach to coherent pricing: insurance companies estimate their implied
utility functions by applying this method to existing products, and then refers to
them in pricing other products.
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Figure 4.1. TP1 and TP2 vs. IP1.0 and IP1.5.
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